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Rethinking the Criminal Responsibility of Young People in England and Wales 
 
1. Abstract:  
In 2010 two boys, aged 10 years, were convicted of the attempted rape of an eight year old 
girl in England. This article will consider the question of when is it fair to hold young people 
criminally responsible and to subject them to the full rigours of a criminal trial. It examines 
the assumption that children today are maturing at an earlier age and argues that the law 
needs to recognise that children may not yet be developed enough to understand the 
wrongfulness of what they do. The article adopts a comparative approach by examining the 
position in Scotland, Ireland and Guernsey. The article also considers the implications of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the reports of the UN Committee 
as well as examining American criminal jurisprudence. 
 
2. Introduction 
 
The conviction in England of two primary school boys for the attempted rape of an eight year 
old girl in 2010 once again case raises the issue of how old someone must be before they 
know they are committing a crime. The two boys were both aged 10 years old at the time of 
the offence and are the youngest males ever to be prosecuted for rape in England and Wales. 
They had been accused of repeatedly assaulting the girl in a block of flats, a lift and a bin 
shed before taking her to a field and raping her in October 2009. During cross-examination 
via video the girl admitted lying to her mother about the incident and admitted that no rape 
had occurred. There was no other useful medical evidence, DNA evidence or forensic 
evidence. Nevertheless based on the evidence of an eight year old girl the two boys were 
convicted of attempted rape. The presiding Judge, Mr Justice Saunders, highlighted the need 
for lessons to be learned from this case. This case raises the question of whether child 
perpetrators should be treated as adults.  
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In England and Wales the age of criminal responsibility is set at 10 years. The current law 
thus assumes all children are sufficiently mature at this age to accept criminal responsibility 
for their behaviour. This article will consider the question of when is it fair to hold young 
people criminally responsible and to subject a young person to the rigours of a criminal trial. 
It will examine the assumption that children mature earlier than in the past and argue that the 
law needs to recognise that children may not yet be developed enough to understand the 
wrongfulness of what they do. I will argue that the low age of criminal responsibility in 
England and Wales runs the risk of children being prosecuted for crimes they are too 
immature to fully understand. A child of 10 years can know that they are doing something 
wrong but not appreciate it is criminally wrong and thus not form the requisite intent, or mens 
rea, to be criminally responsible.  
 
3. Principles of criminal liability 
 
The law, as a system of rules that guides and governs human interaction, is premised on the 
view that humans can understand and follow rules. The law‟s concept of a person is a 
practical, reasoning, rule-following being who understands the difference between right and 
wrong. Effective criminal law requires that citizens understand that certain conduct is 
prohibited, the nature of their conduct and the consequences for doing what the law 
prohibits.
1
 Thus criminal liability “should be imposed only on persons who are sufficiently 
aware of what they are doing, and of the consequences it may have, that they can fairly be 
said to have chosen the behaviour and its consequences”.2 To be convicted of a criminal 
offence the defendant must have performed the actus reus and mens rea of the offence and 
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have no defence available to them. The actus reus is the prohibited conduct of a defendant. 
Mens rea is the mental element required by the definition of the crime. Mens rea has evolved 
into a requirement of positive culpability on the part of the defendant and is the means 
through which those who are thought to be deserving of punishment, because of their 
responsibility and their moral blameworthiness, are identified. Adults are presumed to be 
mature and to have developed their decision-making capacities and thus are held accountable 
for their behaviour. This article will consider whether it is appropriate to hold adults and 
young people as equally responsible and culpable for their behaviour.  
 
When it comes to imposing criminal liability upon children, the law has traditionally 
recognised that children may lack the capacity to be mentally culpable. For example, the pre-
Norman Laws of Ine dating from the eighth century suggest the age of 10 years as the age at 
which young people could be held criminally responsible for their actions, below 10 years of 
age they were considered to lack mens rea. Bracton‟s 13th century treatise does not specify a 
minimum age of criminal responsibility but does refer to children being protected from the 
criminal law by virtue of their “harmlessness of intention”, equating a child‟s “innocence of 
purpose” with a “lack of intention to harm”.3 Young children were considered to lack the 
capacity to form culpable intent and thus could not be criminally responsible. By the 15
th
 
century the pre-Norman age limits had been lowered to seven years of age. The Children Act 
1908 created a separate and distinct system of justice for children based on the assumption 
that the basic competencies of young people and adults differ in fundamental ways that affect 
judgment. The 1908 Act represented the first time in England that a statute recognized that 
children were less responsible than adults for their actions and should not be subject to the 
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full rigours of the criminal law. Subsequently section 50 of the Children and Young Persons 
Act 1933 raised the age of criminal responsibility from seven to eight years and the Children 
and Young Persons Act 1963 raised it to the current age of 10 years.  
 
Although the minimum age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales is much lower 
than most other countries in Europe and many countries worldwide, traditionally the English 
youth justice system has not prosecuted young people once they have achieved the age of 
criminal responsibility, instead the presumption of doli incapax was invoked. The 
presumption of doli incapax meant that children would only be held criminally responsible if 
in addition to committing the actus reus and mens rea of a criminal offence, the prosecution 
could also prove, beyond all reasonable doubt, that when doing the act, the child knew that 
what they were doing was seriously wrong as opposed to being merely mischievous or 
naughty. Thus under English law a child below the age of 10 was considered doli incapax, a 
child between 10 and 14 was presumed doli incapax as at this age children were considered 
incapable of identifying right from wrong, and therefore lacked the criminal intent necessary 
for prosecution. To convict the child, the prosecution would need to rebut this presumption. 
The presumption of doli incapax ensured that the law treated people as fully responsible from 
14 years of age while also reflecting a concern that “using criminal penalties to punish a child 
who does not appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her actions lacks moral justification”.4 
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However attitudes towards children changed during the late twentieth century. In C (A Minor) 
v DPP
5
, which concerned the actions of a 12 year old boy who had been caught with a 
companion tampering with a motorbike, Mr Justice Laws in the High Court ruled that the 
presumption of doli incapax was “no longer part of the law of England”. Laws J believed that 
the argument that a child of 12 years of age would not appreciate the moral obliquity of his 
actions was out of touch with today‟s society and contrary to common sense. Laws J argued 
that: 
“whatever may have been the position in an earlier age, when there was no system of 
universal compulsory education … this presumption at the present time is a serious 
disservice to our law”.6 
 
The judgment of Laws J was subsequently overruled by the House of Lords
7
 on the grounds 
of legal propriety and the respective roles of the judiciary and parliament, rather than because 
of any judicial commitment to the merits of the presumption. Lord Lowry in the House of 
Lords stated that “the presumption has in recent years been the object of some logical and 
forceful criticisms” and that the presumption “is not, and never has been, completely logical”. 
Lord Jauncey described the presumption as “an affront to common sense”. Nevertheless the 
House of Lords ruled that abolishing the presumption of doli incapax was a significant 
change to the law and thus was a matter for parliament to consider rather than the judiciary. 
The arrival of the New Labour government in May 1997 signalled a willingness to accept the 
views of the High Court and the House of Lords. The White Paper No More Excuses 
recommended modernising “the archaic rule of doli incapax” as it was “contrary to common 
sense” which is “not in the interests of justice, or victims or of the young people 
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themselves”.8 The New Labour government, echoing the judgment of Laws J, asserted that 
the presumption might have been justified in an earlier era but that the existence of 
compulsory education from the age of five meant that children grew up much quicker, 
mentally and physically, and therefore knew right from wrong.
9
 Following this White Paper 
came the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, section 34 of which abolished the presumption of 
doli incapax. Section 34 thus means that a child aged 10 years of age is no longer presumed 
incapable of understanding the nature of criminal conduct and can be considered as legally 
responsible for their actions as an adult. Thus English law now “holds that a person is 
completely irresponsible on the day before his tenth birthday and fully responsible as soon as 
the jelly and ice-cream have been cleared away the following day”.10 For Bandalli the 
abolition of doli incapax reflects a steady erosion of the special consideration afforded to 
children and is “symbolic of the state‟s limited vision in understanding children, the nature of 
childhood or the true meaning of an appropriate criminal law response”.11 Similarly Fionda 
refers to the abolition of doli incapax as being part of an “almost stubborn blindness towards 
the incapacity of children.” Its abolition reflects a complete refusal to recognise the nature of 
childhood and places greater emphasis on „justice‟ and less emphasis on „youth‟.12 A brief 
survey of the age of criminal responsibility and the proportion of children that make up the 
prison population in European countries suggests that the lower the age of criminal 
responsibility, the larger the youth custodial population. Thus the countries with the lowest 
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ages of criminal responsibility – England and Wales, Turkey and Northern Ireland - fall 
within the top 6 highest youth prison populations.
13
  
 
4. Are children mature enough to understand the nature of criminal liability?  
 
As doli incapax is no longer available, any child aged 10 years or older is now held to 
understand the significance of their actions unless they are suffering from a recognised 
medical condition. The abolition of the presumption is partly based on the universal 
availability of education from the age of five years. However in C (A Minor) v DPP, Lord 
Lowry responded with the observation that “better formal education and earlier sophistication 
do not guarantee that the child will more readily distinguish right from wrong”.14 
 
Furthermore Cavadino observes that “in view of the association between truancy and 
offending ... many of the children concerned have in practice failed to benefit from universal 
compulsory education”.15 To ensure that children understand the nature of criminal conduct, 
it is crucially important that young people attend school and the child‟s experience at school 
needs to be a positive one. However various studies have found a strong link between truancy 
and youth crime, both of which were found to have begun at the same time. The Offending, 
Crime and Justice Survey noted that truancy was a „high risk‟ characteristic since 62% of 
truants in their study admitted to offending and/or anti-social behaviour.
16
 The findings from 
that Survey echo the findings of earlier research. For example, Graham and Bowling found 
that 67% of young males who had truanted from school admitted offences, whereas only 38% 
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of non-truants offended.
17
 Graham and Bowling concluded that for both males and females 
the odds of offending of those who truanted were more than three times greater than for those 
who had not truanted. The Youth Lifestyles survey 1998/99 found that the more persistent the 
truant the higher the offending rates.
18
 Among males aged 12 to 16 years 47% of those who 
had truanted more than once a month reported offending behaviour compared with 13% of 
those who had truanted less often and only 10% of non-truants. Clearly there is a reciprocal 
relationship between delinquency and truancy, truancy may be both a cause and a 
consequence of juvenile offending behaviour; therefore it is difficult to determine which 
causes which. Nonetheless the probability of committing offences rises considerably if 
truanting or excluded from school, especially permanently excluded. In 2005 the National 
Audit Office reported that the government had spent £885 million on anti-truancy initiatives 
in the period 1997-2004.
19
 Despite this increased spending, the rate of unauthorised absence 
remained the same. The most recent figures show the rate of unauthorised absence as higher 
than any annual figures since 1998 with 68,000 pupils absent from school every day.
20
  
 
Not only must the child be attending school, but the child‟s experience of school and the 
extent to which they enjoy school, do well and achieve good results can be significant factors 
in preventing crime. Crosnoe et al. found that academic achievement was directly related to 
lower levels of delinquent behaviour.
21
 Studies conducted on violent behaviour and academic 
abilities have also found that juveniles with high grades were less likely to be involved in 
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violent behaviour and that violence increased as learning difficulties increased.
22
 Graham and 
Bowling found that detachment from school was a significant indicator of offending 
behaviour especially in young females.
23
 The Offending, Crime and Justice Survey asked 
respondents about their school environment and those who complained of poor teaching 
quality and a lack of clear rules, amongst other problems, also reported a 50% offending 
rate.
24
 The Survey found that decreasing levels of school discipline increased the likelihood 
of an offending trajectory and drug use. Consequently it recommended that further 
consideration be given to enhancing schools‟ disciplinary policies.  
 
Rather than using the availability of universal education as a justification for subjecting 
young people to the full rigours of the criminal justice system, greater attention needs to be 
paid to the links between the education system and the young person‟s offending behaviour. 
Universal education does not necessarily act as a guarantee that young people will understand 
the nature of criminal conduct, but may instead be part of the problem. Engaging young 
people in suitable education is fundamental to preventing them from offending in the future. 
However issues of education cannot be viewed in isolation from other aspects of a young 
person‟s life. The family has an important role to play in children‟s school adjustment, 
attendance and performance. Parents‟ involvement in school and monitoring of school 
performance lessens the likelihood of school failure and associated outcomes such as youth 
offending.
25
 In Wadsworth‟s study, comprising just over 5,000 persons born in 1946 it was 
found that the more interest parents took in their son‟s schooling, as measured by teachers, 
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the less likely it was that the son would become a young offender.
26
 Wadsworth‟s study was 
an investigation into the health, growth, development and criminal records of the children in 
the survey. At primary school 25% of boys whose parents were rated lowest became juvenile 
offenders compared with 7.5% of those rated highest. Even greater differences were found at 
the secondary school stage, 34.2% and 8% respectively. Graham and Bowling found that 
school truants usually had a poor relationship with one or both parents, family members in 
trouble with the law, low attachment to family and were poorly supervised in that their 
parents frequently did not know where their child was, whom they were with or what they 
were doing.
27
 Child sexual abuse also has a significant impact on children‟s education 
including social development, school behaviour, learning, bullying and truancy.
28
 Such 
children are more likely to truant from school and to engage in offending behaviour. Hart et 
al found that the risk factors for violent juvenile offending include parental conflict, learning 
difficulties and school failure. The protective factors assessed included parenting styles and 
academic achievement.
29
 If the government is serious about tackling juvenile offending 
behaviour then rather than subjecting young people to the rigours of the criminal justice 
system from the age of 10, resources must be allocated to intervene positively in young 
people‟s lives to prevent them engaging in offending behaviour. Providing families and 
school with support may be an effective way of preventing socially alienated and vulnerable 
children from becoming offenders. Such an approach should help to keep children out of the 
criminal justice system, an already overcrowded system where vulnerable and needy children 
do not belong. 
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A recent study by the Youth Research Forum found that by the age of seven years, children 
are able to distinguish between right and wrong and seem to have some awareness of the 
criminal implications of their behaviour.
30
 This was an online quantitative survey based on a 
nationally representative sample of 750 7-16 year olds. However research which has 
examined the brain developments and cognitive functioning of adolescents has found that 
with respect to moral culpability, those parts of the brain that deal with judgement, impulsive 
behaviour and foresight develop in the twenties rather than the teen years.
31
 Neuroscience 
data using MRI images has found that there are developmental differences in the brain‟s 
biochemistry and anatomy that may limit adolescents‟ ability to perceive risks, control 
impulses, understand consequences and control emotions.
32
 The prefrontal lobe of the brain 
that mediates emotional impulses does not fully develop until the mid-twenties. The 
prefrontal cortex is involved in controlling goal directed behaviour, emotional processing and 
decision processing. Because the prefrontal lobe is not fully mature and is still developing 
during adolescence, teens are almost inevitably overly emotional and subject to wide mood 
swings, immature judgment, decreased risk perception and impaired future-time 
perspective.
33
 Also it has been found that 60% of children in the criminal justice system have 
significant speech, language or communication difficulties,
34
 30% have a learning disability, 
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10% suffer from anxiety disorders and 5% have symptoms of psychosis.
35
 The association 
between speech and language disorders and behavioural difficulties is well established.
36
 
Communication problems tend to be labelled as behaviour problems and difficulties in 
understanding make young people very vulnerable in relation to education.
37
 Offender 
treatment programmes are almost all language based. Communication problems will prevent 
young people from accessing these programmes and so increase their risk of re-offending. 
Speech and language therapy interventions with children can reduce the impact of their 
speech and language impairments consequently reducing their risk of developing behavioural 
and conduct problems and therefore reducing the risk of offending. 
 
Although children may understand the difference between right and wrong from the age of 
seven years and may have some understanding of the criminal implications of their conduct, 
they do not yet possess the emotional maturity to control their impulsivity and appreciate the 
consequences of their actions. Children and young people are less mature than adults in terms 
of the judgment factors of responsibility, perspective and sensation seeking and thus 
experience difficulties in weighing and comparing consequences when making decisions and 
contemplating the meaning of long-range consequences that will be realized many years in 
the future.
38
 The English criminal justice system does not account for the evidence that 
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children and young people differ in developmental maturity from adults and thus are less 
culpable than adults for their choices and behaviour. These cognitive difficulties also have 
implications for young peoples‟ ability to be competent defendants in adversarial 
atmospheres.
39
 Children and young people may have the capacity to perform competently and 
responsibly, but this does not mean that they are capable of exercising maturity of judgment. 
To apply the same standards to a 13 year old as an adult is to ignore large amounts of 
evidence about the life circumstances of children at that age. Youth offending behaviour 
represents a breakdown by the family, schools and child to teach and learn, respectively, 
proper conformity to lawful social order. Many youths entering the youth justice system have 
serious multiple problems in terms of their school achievement, psychological health and 
family life. Youth crime policies and interventions therefore need to avoid a narrow focus on 
the crime and take into account the family, social and contextual factors that are frequently 
associated with youth offending. Under the normal rules of criminal law, a defendant whose 
decision-making capacities are impaired, for example by mental illness, are deemed less 
blameworthy than typical offenders. The evidence supports the conclusion that children and 
adolescents are less capable decision-makers than adults in ways that are relevant to their 
criminal choices.
40
 If young people lack the capacity to make a meaningful choice and to 
control their impulses, should they be held criminally culpable for their behaviour? 
 
These views are also reflected in judgments of English and US courts. The US Supreme 
Court decision in Roper v Simmons
41
 which declared the juvenile death penalty 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Children, Social Sciences and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) pp. 
270-300.  
39
 J.L. Woolard, loc. cit.  
40
 E. Scott, L. Steinberg, „Adolescent development and the regulation of youth crime‟, 18 The 
Future of Children (2008) 15-33, 20.  
41
 (2005) 543 US 551 
15 
 
unconstitutional also accepted and reaffirmed the presumption of the diminished 
responsibility of youth. The US Supreme Court ruled that young people‟s objective 
immaturity, vulnerability and comparative lack of control over their immediate surroundings 
renders them less culpable than adult criminals. In England, Lord Steyn, in the case of R v G 
and R
42
 emphasised that ignoring the special position of children in the criminal justice 
system is not acceptable in a modern civil society. In the same case Lord Bingham held that 
conviction of serious crime should depend on proof not simply that the defendant caused (by 
act or omission) an injurious result to another but that his state of mind was culpable when so 
acting. Bingham believed that although it was clearly blameworthy to take an obvious and 
significant risk of causing injury to another, it was not clearly blameworthy to do something 
involving a risk of injury to another if the accused genuinely did not perceive the risk. Such a 
person might fairly be accused of stupidity or lack of imagination, but neither of those 
failings should expose him to conviction of serious crime or risk of punishment. This case 
concerned two boys aged 11 and 12 years who went camping overnight without their parents‟ 
permission. During the course of this trip they threw lit newspapers under a plastic wheelie 
bin and caused £1 million of damage to a shop. The boys thought there was no risk of the fire 
spreading in the way it eventually did. Lord Bingham held that it was neither moral nor just 
to convict a young person on the strength of what someone else would have apprehended if 
the defendant himself had no such apprehension. As Lord Diplock stated, in the differing 
context of the partial defence of provocation to murder, “to require old heads on young 
shoulders is inconsistent with the law‟s compassion of human infirmity”.43  
 
                                                          
42
 [2003] UKHL 50, 53 
43
 Camplin [1978] AC 705, 717 
16 
 
The Law Commission for England and Wales also recently emphasised the view that desert 
based on moral fault is a necessary precondition for just punishment particularly in the 
context of young offenders. The Law Commission recommended that „developmental 
immaturity‟ be incorporated into the defence of diminished responsibility, which is a partial 
defence to murder.
44
 The Law Commission recommended that it should be possible for the 
courts to consider whether the young person‟s developmental immaturity and cognitive 
limitations impairs their ability to stand trial for murder. The judgment that the actor is 
responsible has to be made first and this is why it is permissible to blame him or her for their 
actions, because a judgment has been made that he or she is a responsible actor. However this 
recommendation was not included in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. The 2009 Act thus 
disregards the reality that terms such as „intention‟ cannot and should not be applied without 
taking account of the large differences in capacity and judgment between adults and children. 
Moore argues that criminal liability should be avoided for a wrongful action if “at the 
moment of such action‟s performance, one did not have sufficient capacity or opportunity to 
make the choice to do otherwise”.45 Moore views infancy as within the category of „status 
excuses‟ concerning “individuals who do not and cannot function well enough for us to 
confidently liken their actions and intentions to the actions and intention of sober, sane 
adults.” Similarly Arenella asks “why should someone qualify as a moral agent if he lacks the 
capacity to deliberate about whether he should have acted differently?”.46 Until a young 
person is 16 years old they cannot consent to sexual relations or join the armed forces. The 
age at which you can buy cigarettes or alcohol or vote is 18 years. Thus the law recognises 
that these actions require a certain level of maturity and capacity and that children need 
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protection from the consequences of their immaturity in various areas of their lives. This 
should be equally appropriate for criminal responsibility, otherwise childhood becomes 
irrelevant to criminalisation.
47
 
 
5. Human rights obligations 
 
In R v G and R Lord Steyn argued that the criminal law was obliged to consider the mental 
incapactity of children in assessing their responsibility for criminal acts and drew special 
attention to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 40.1 of which 
provides for the right of every child: 
“… alleged as, accused of, or recognised as having infringed the penal law to be 
treated in a manner consistent with the promotion of the child‟s sense of dignity 
and worth … and the desirability of promoting the child‟s reintegration in[to] 
society.”  
Article 40 of the Convention also requires each state to set a reasonable minimum age of 
criminal responsibility. The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Administration of Juvenile Justice 1985 (the Beijing Rules) recommend that the minimum 
age of criminal responsibility should not be fixed at too low an age level, bearing in mind 
the facts of emotional, mental and intellectual maturity. The important consideration, as 
outlined in Rule 17 of the Beijing Rules, is whether a child, by virtue of his or her 
individual discernment and understanding, can be held responsible for their behaviour. 
The Commentary to the Beijing Rules stresses that there should be a close relationship 
between the age of criminal responsibility and the age at which young people acquire 
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other social rights such as marital status and the right to vote. In line with this rule the UN 
Committee on the Rights of the Child has recommended the age of 12 years as the 
absolute minimum age of criminal responsibility. The UN Committee also strongly 
recommended that states parties set a minimum age of criminal responsibility that does not 
allow, by way of exception, the use of a lower age.
48
 In its report in 2002 the UN 
Committee expressed that it was “particularly concerned” about “the abolition of the 
principle of doli incapax” in England and Wales and recommended that the age of 
criminal responsibility should be raised considerably.
49
  
 
The European Committee of Social Rights has also declared that the age of criminal 
responsibility in England is “manifestly too low” and accordingly was not in conformity with 
Article 17 of the European Social Charter which provides mothers and children with a right 
to social and economic protection.
50
 The European Social Charter is a Council of Europe 
treaty, signed in 1961, which guarantees social and economic human rights. The Council of 
Europe‟s Human Rights Commissioner has also frequently expressed concern at the low age 
of criminal responsibility in England. The Commissioner in 2005, Alvarez Gil-Robles, 
commented that he had “extreme difficulty in accepting that a child of 12 or 13 can be 
criminally culpable for his actions, in the same sense as an adult”.51 While noting that the 
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European Convention on Human Rights does not require any age limit to be set before a child 
can be held criminally responsible, the Commissioner suggested that the age level in England 
should to be raised to bring it into line with other European countries. In 2006 the current 
Commissioner, Thomas Hammarberg, argued for an increase in the age of criminal 
responsibility across Europe with the aim of progressively reaching 18 years and 
recommended that innovative systems of responding to juvenile offenders below that age 
should be tried with a genuine focus on their education, reintegration and rehabilitation.
52
 
Domestically, the House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on Human 
Rights recommend that the age of criminal responsibility be increased to 12 years.
53
 The Joint 
Committee argued that unless evidence of the effectiveness of the present age of criminal 
responsibility in reducing crime and disorder can be convincingly presented, then it needs to 
be brought more in line with England‟s European neighbours. Such a recommendation would 
meet both the requirements of effective criminal justice and our duty under the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child to uphold children‟s human rights.  
 
England‟s closest neighbours have taken steps to increasing their ages of criminal 
responsibility. In Scotland the age of criminal responsibility remains at eight years of age but 
the age at which children can be prosecuted in adult criminal courts has been raised to 12.
54
 
This change brings Scots law into line with jurisdictions across Europe and will mean that 
children between the age of eight and 12 years will instead be held to account for any 
offending behaviour through Children‟s Hearings. This system, which is respected 
internationally, addresses the needs and behaviour of children and young people who face 
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serious problems in their lives. In Guernsey the Children Law 2008, effective since January 
2010, significantly reformed arrangements for dealing with children in conflict with the law. 
The age of criminal responsibility has been raised to 12 years and the criminal court has been 
largely replaced by the Child Youth and Community Tribunal (CYCT), closely modelled on 
the Scottish Children‟s Hearing system. Unlike the Scottish system, however, which has a cut 
off at age 16, tribunals will deal with nearly all children below the age of 18 years. In the 
Republic of Ireland the Children Act 2001 raised the age of criminal responsibility in Ireland 
from seven to 12 years. This change means that children up to the age of 12 cannot be 
charged with a criminal offence. However the Criminal Justice Act 2006 allows for children 
as young as 10 years of age in Ireland to be charged with the offences of murder, rape and 
aggravated sexual assault. The Criminal Justice Act 2006 also abolished the rebuttable 
presumption of doli incapax which applied to any child between seven and 14 years. Children 
between 12 and 14, and those between 10 and 14 if they have been charged with a serious 
offence, no longer enjoy the presumption of doli incapax. For serious offences Ireland now 
shares with England one of the lowest ages of criminal responsibility in Europe.  
 
There is evidence that public opinion would favour an approach to youth offending which 
recognises the particular vulnerability of young people. The Independent Commission on 
Youth Crime and Antisocial Behaviour found that public attitudes towards dealing with 
crime in Britain have hardened in the past 40 years and are among the most punitive to be 
found in any European country.
55
 „Lenient sentencing‟ has been widely perceived as a 
cause of both youth and adult crime and appears to be a significant reason for the lack of 
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confidence expressed in the youth justice system.
56
 However the Commission found that 
public views on youth crime are more complex than they appear. When participants in 
surveys have been given in-depth information about real cases and asked to select an 
appropriate sentence, their choice of sanction has turned out to be either similar or more 
lenient than the sentence that was actually imposed by a court.
57
 Although abstract 
questions about offenders and offending may elicit an immediate, punitive response, 
people tend to be more thoughtful and fair-minded when exposed to the facts and 
background of particular cases.
58
 More generally there are indications that the public 
express less punitive views towards young offenders than adults. Attitude surveys show 
agreement that youth and immaturity can be mitigating factors, especially if the offence 
did not involve weapons or violence. „Deliberative‟ surveys, where the participants take a 
view on specific cases after learning about the background circumstances reveal an 
approach to sentencing that is even more temperate. For example, knowing that a young 
person is remorseful and has taken reparative steps to make good some of the harm their 
behaviour has caused to a victim can have a powerful influence in reducing demands for 
custodial sentences.
59
 A ComRes poll launched in March 2011 and conducted on behalf of 
the Transition to Adulthood (T2A) Alliance found that a majority of both the public (69%) 
and members of parliament (81%) believed that emotional and psychological maturity 
should be taken into account by the courts when dealing with a young person who breaks 
the law. Similarly, US research has found that the public may be more receptive to 
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differential treatment of youth and to more rehabilitative rather than punitive policies. 
Scott et al. in their study found little support for trying young people as adults or for 
treating young offenders as adults.
60
 A study conducted by the MacArthur foundation 
found that a majority of the public supports rehabilitation over incarceration and is willing 
to pay an additional 20% in taxes to provide rehabilitative services to young offenders.
61
 
The Justice Policy Institute found that “what the public wants ... are rational and effective 
juvenile justice reforms that treat young people in developmentally appropriate ways”.62 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The Prison Reform Trust reported that many who work in the field of youth justice are 
convinced that the adversarial court system of England and Wales is inappropriate as a means 
of addressing the wrong doing of children.
63
 Young defendants often do not understand legal 
proceedings or the language used by lawyers, they report feeling intimidated and isolated in 
court and may not receive a proper explanation of what has happened until after a hearing is 
over.
64
 They also feel frustration that the courts seem rarely to understand the context in 
which their offences were committed, including the pressures facing them.  
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The Privy Council stated in a different context in the case of Kunnath v the State
65
 that it was 
an essential principle of the criminal law that a criminal trial should be conducted in the 
presence of the defendant and that the defendant “should be able to understand the 
proceedings and decide what witnesses he wishes to call, whether or not to give evidence and 
if so, upon what matters relevant to the case against him.” In V. v the United Kingdom and T. 
v the United Kingdom
66
 the European Court of Human Rights determined that the trial of a 
child aged as young as 11 does not in itself give rise to a breach of the Convention, as long as 
effective participation is ensured. This requires that the child is dealt with in a manner which 
takes full account of his or her age, level of maturity and intellectual and emotional 
capacities, and that steps are taken to promote his or her ability to understand and participate. 
In S.C. v United Kingdom
67
 the European Court of Human Rights held that when a child faces 
prosecution there is a risk that he will be unable to participate effectively because of his 
young age and limited intellectual capacity and stated that „effective participation‟ in this 
context pre-supposes that the accused has a broad understanding of the nature of the trial 
process and of what is at stake for him, including the significance of any penalty that may be 
imposed. The young defendant should be able to follow what is said by prosecution witnesses 
and to explain his version of events, point out any statements with which he disagrees and 
make his lawyers aware of any facts which should be put forward in his defence: Young 
people must have a rational understanding of court proceedings in order for them to be able to 
participate meaningfully in any court case involving them. If young people are not 
sufficiently mature and competent to understand the process of a trial in a criminal court, can 
they be held criminally culpable for their behaviour?  
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Furthermore Newbury‟s study found that the current youth justice system‟s restorative justice 
approaches do not work for the very young offender in that they are complex, process-
oriented and laden with language, and requirements for conference-style meetings, beyond 
the grasp of most 10, 11 or 12 year olds. The complex terminology (reparation, contract, etc) 
and the meeting-based, rather than activity-based, approach is too demanding for the majority 
of the youngest offenders.
68
  
 
The age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales should be reviewed with a view to 
raising it at least to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child recommended minimum of 
12 years with the aim of progressively reaching 18 years as recommended by the Council of 
Europe‟s Human Rights Commissioner. Meanwhile the presumption of doli incapax should 
be re-established, and children who commit offences should be dealt with through a welfare-
based approach. The adoption of a welfare approach to child offending does not imply that 
the harms caused by youth offending should be tolerated, but means ensuring that all children 
who are alleged to have offended have access to the range of health and social care services 
they require whether they are formally prosecuted or not. And with respect to those who are 
prosecuted, it entails recognising fully the range of difficulties that they are likely to face 
throughout the court process, and taking steps to address them.  
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